Dominoes by Petsko, Gregory A
Somewhere in Washington, DC (or maybe London, or 
Brussels,  or  Tokyo),  a  science  administrator  makes  a 
decision. A group of well-known scientists from presti-
gious institutions has recommended a new Big Science 
Program. It will generate reams of data, they say, that will 
lead  to  new  insights  into  an  important  biomedical 
problem.  It  will  impress  Congress  with  our  vision  and 
productivity. It will garner great press. And it will only 
cost US$100 million, less than 3% of the budget of the 
administrator’s agency. The administrator realizes what 
being associated with such a big, important activity will 
do for his prestige and chances for advancement. He goes 
to see his boss, the head of the agency, and recommends 
to her that the project be approved. She, too, recognizes 
the opportunity that such a project represents to enhance 
her own standing among her peers, and to facilitate the 
advocacy for her budget with political leaders. The Big 
Science Program even has a sexy name and a memorable 
acronym. She approves it, funding it at $100 million a 
year for 5 years. What she doesn’t realize is that, in so 
doing, she has tipped over a little black rectangular tile, 
with a line dividing its face into two square ends, each 
end being marked with a number of spots.
That  tile  is  next  to  a  long  row  of  others,  unseen  in 
Washington (or Berlin, or Paris, or Beijing), and one by 
one they start to fall over. In a small university town in 
the  Midwestern  USA,  a  young  scientist  submits  a 
research grant to that same agency. It’s not big science, 
just an individual research project driven by the curiosity 
of  that  investigator  to  see  if  a  hypothesis  she  has 
formulated  is  true  or  not.  The  grant  makes  its  way 
through  the  peer-review  system  where,  eventually,  it 
receives a score in the 7th percentile range, meaning that 
it is in the top 7% of all grants reviewed, but not in the 
top  6%.  This  is  the  sort  of  score  that  would  normally 
cause a young investigator to break out the champagne. 
However, because the Big Science Project has consumed 
$100 million of the budget, this year the agency is only 
able to fund applications in the 5th percentile or better. 
You see, $100 million is only 3% of the agency’s budget, 
but it represents the funding of at least 100 individual 
investigator-driven grants. Because her proposal did not 
get  funded,  the  young  investigator  has  to  let  three 
postdocs and two technicians go. Only one of them is 
able  to  find  a  job  elsewhere  in  science.  The  young 
investigator, unable to get her project funded, is not given 
tenure at her institution and decides to leave science. A 
pity; her project, had it succeeded, would have identified 
a new target for the treatment of an incurable form of 
cancer. The discovery of that target is thus delayed by 11 
years, and during that time, 42,000 people will die of the 
disease.
Not every one of those 100 grants that didn’t get funded 
would  have  had  such  repercussions,  of  course,  but  in 
aggregate, they would have meant employment in science 
for over 1,000 trained people. Meanwhile, the heads of 
the Big Science Program are busy hiring their 100 em-
ploy  ees,  and  garnering  lots  of  publicity  at  their  insti-
tutions for the money they are bringing in and the jobs it 
has created.
In a small town in China (or maybe India, or Russia), a 
young  science  student  receives  an  email  from  a 
department at a university in the USA (or maybe the UK, 
or  Italy).  It  says  that  the  sender  is  sorry,  but  they  are 
unable to offer the young science student a place in their 
graduate  program  in  cell  biology  (or  biochemistry,  or 
neuroscience,  or  immunology).  A  training  grant  that 
usually funded their domestic graduate students was not 
renewed because the funding agency didn’t have enough 
money to fund all the worthwhile training grants, and so 
the university is going to have to support its domestic 
students  with  money  usually  reserved  for  foreign 
applicants. The Chinese student’s foreign language score 
wasn’t very good, so this was his only chance to study 
abroad. He ends up going to his local university instead. 
A  pity  because,  had  he  gone  to  the  US  university,  he 
would eventually become a US citizen, and gone on to 
start a biotechnology company that would have made a 
product  that  revolutionized  genome  sequencing.  The 
company would have employed at least 500 people, in 
part  of  Michigan  that  is  desperate  for  jobs.  He  does 
eventually start just such a company, but it’s in Shanghai.
Not every one of the foreign students who would have 
come  to  the  USA,  but  didn’t  because  the  Big  Science  © 2010 BioMed Central Ltd
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an impact, of course, but enough of them would have to 
result the creation of about 5,000 new jobs nationwide.
And somewhere in New Mexico (or maybe Toulouse, 
or  Sienna,  or  Cape  Town),  a  high  school  student  who 
dreams of becoming a scientist is told that the summer 
internship  he  has  been  dreaming  of  landing  in  a 
university laboratory will not come to pass, because the 
funds  for  such  internships  were  cut  this  year  by  the 
agency that normally provided them. It seems they had to 
find the money to start some Big Science Program - very 
flashy,  exciting  new  stuff.  ‘Discovery-driven’  research 
they called it, which sounds very glamorous and adven-
turous  (and  so  much  better  than  ‘fishing  expedition’). 
Deeply  disappointed,  the  high  school  student  takes  a 
summer job in a brokerage house instead, and ends up 
going into finance as a career. A pity, because, 10 years 
later, he will invent the new financial instrument whose 
widespread use (and misuse) will tip the country into a 
deep recession, costing maybe 4 million jobs.
Somewhere in Washington, DC (or maybe London, or 
Brussels, or Tokyo), a science administrator is reviewing 
the  Big  Science  Program.  It  has  produced  terabytes  of 
data,  but  no  important  discoveries.  Its  initial  funding 
period is coming to an end, and an external review panel 
has  recommended  that  it  be  phased  out.  The  decision 
that now must be made is whether to do that or continue 
it. The heads of the Big Science program argue not merely 
that  it  be  continued,  but  expanded,  to  increase  the 
likelihood of making a big discovery. They will then be 
able to employ 120 people - think what a good thing that 
would be. While not saying so explicitly, they imply that 
Congress  might  not  be  happy  if  the  program  were 
terminated, as that would suggest that its initial funding 
might have been a mistake. Congress, of course, never 
wastes money - only silly scientists do that. The science 
administrator  also  knows  that  his  own  prestige  -  and 
possible promotion - are tied to this program, which he 
originally  backed.  The  decision  is  an  easy  one.  He 
recommends renewal, with an increased budget. The head 
of his agency, afraid that to admit the program didn’t work 
would give Congress a license to cut her budget, approves 
the recommendation. What she doesn’t realize is that, in 
so doing, she has tipped over a rectangular tile with a line 
dividing  its  face  into  two  square  ends,  each  end  being 
marked with a number of spots.
I am not categorically opposed to big science programs. 
Many  of  them  have  been  very  worthwhile,  and  have 
produced results that have fueled a significant number of 
investigator-initiated,  hypothesis-driven  projects.  But 
many others have not. The problem is not that some have 
failed (we should always have a respectable failure rate in 
science, otherwise we are not taking enough risks), it is 
that we never seem to be able to discontinue any of them, 
not  even  the  ones  that  have  failed  or  outlived  their 
usefulness. They grow, morph into even bigger programs, 
or reproduce themselves, like some alien creature out of a 
1950s B-movie. And because the total amount of money 
available for science is finite, their existence, and their 
growth,  comes  at  a  price,  a  price  we  never  seem  to 
consider until long after they spring to life - a life they, 
through their supporters, cling to with all the tenacity of 
an actual living organism.
The time to consider such consequences is before such 
projects  start  -  before  we  are  so  invested  in  them, 
financially  and  emotionally,  that  we  cannot  extricate 
ourselves when we should. When administrators, urged 
on by a set of powerful scientists who see big programs as 
their ticket to fame and even more power, advocate big, 
‘discovery-driven’ programs in the halls of Congress and 
the offices of funding agencies, is there anyone to ask who 
profits from such an activity, and whether that profit is 
worth the cost? Is there anyone who will remind us, in 
our eagerness for the new, the flashy, the easily sold, that 
there is a price to be paid for everything, and it may be a 
much bigger price than we can see from where we stand? 
Who will ask, and who will listen to, the question that 
must be asked whenever we are tempted to follow the 
siren song of big science: if we do this, what will we not 
be able to do as a consequence?
For want of a nail the shoe was lost.
For want of a shoe the horse was lost.
For want of a horse the rider was lost.
For want of a rider the battle was lost.
For want of a battle the kingdom was lost.
And the dominoes tumble.
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